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A previous study ("Research Relating to State Highway Laws", reported 
January 1967) afforded us an opportunity to review a vast array of literature 
and statutory law pertaining to enabling legislation and administrative author-
ity to construct and maintain highways. It was surprising to find that the 
statutes are void of guidance on certain subjects: there are great "bodies" 
of unwritten or non-statutory laws which are referred to as "common law" and 
"civil law", which are deeply rooted in the past; many are doctrinal or equit-
able; many are extraordinary and argumentative -- they should not be confused 
with Civil Procedure. They have been described as the laws of "private rights" 
and offer redress of grievances when statutory or constitutional laws are not 
specific. 
The right to own and possess land is constitutional; riparian rights 
attach -- some authorities contend that riparian rights cannot be severed and 
sold. Formerly, the attitude toward ownership of land was that rights extended 
from the center of the earth to the sky above and that owners rights were in-
violable except through eminent domain and "due process". Modern attitudes 
superimpose a limited-use or "public interest" condition upon private ownership. 
Even so, an owner of land may not perpetuate a nuisance or use his land in ways 
which are injurious or damaging to others. Interestingly enough, a nuisance 
does not exist until someone is injured by it; priority of occupation does not 
constitute a prescriptive right. 
The Department incurs liabilities when private rights are invaded or 
usurped. In some jurisdictions the state has been held liable in the same 
manner as a private owner; where sovereign immunity persists, damage to private 
property may be described as "nuisance", 
11 trespass11 , or "negligence"~ Ultimately, 
such actions are held as a taking of or adverse possession of private property, 
A. 0. Neiser, State Highway Engineer 
April 1, 1970 
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It is a foregone fact that the construction of highways involves altera-
tions of the land and drainage patterns. Indeed, the Department is empowered 
to recover land for these purposes and to justly compensate owners for complete 
or partial takings as well as for damage to remaining property, The necessity 
of, providing adequate drainage for highways probably pre-dates Roman or Civil 
Law. Yet the "due process" taking does not privilege the state to abuse the 
properties of adjacent owners. The fact that water flows downhill has never 
been disputed, Because this is inherent in nature, the owner of lower land was 
once deemed servient to higher lands and, therefore, must accept natural drain-
age of water from above. Subsequently, in common law, it was deemed permissive 
for owners of higher lands to cast unwanted waters onto lower lands as a burden. 
There, too, the water, if unwanted or damaging, became a hostile force. Unwanted 
water thus became a common enemy -- to be successively and expediently disposed 
of or prevented from entering. Hence, the common law concept could ultimately 
lead to a complete impasse. 
To augment or improve natural drainage should be satisfying to all parties (a truism), but to tap additional sources (areas) and to concentrate waters in 
channels having insufficient capacity to carry the excess is offensive to all, 
To 11 change 11 , 11 increase" or "accelerate" the normal flow of water violates no 
law of man nor of nature; to injure or damage others by such contrivances or 
artifices is subject to redress. Natural drainage cannot be preserved forever; 
alterations made to enable habitation and cultivation alter primeval conditions; 
consequently, two modified but similar doctrines have emerged; they are: 
1. Balance of convenience doctrine, 
2. Reasonable use doctrine. 
It is interesting to note that these doctrines are not dependent upon nor 
do they issue from physical laws of nature (such as the "hydrological cycle") 
but do, seemingly, supersede former doctrines. 
The difficulty with the reasonable use doctrine is that only a 
be considered qualified to determine what is reasonable and what is 
may also be so in respect to the balance of convenience doctrine 




In some situations, it is conceivable that although the Department committed 
no offense, it would be held responsible because it possesses the only power to 
provide relief, For example, if the Department constructs a road enabling or 
attr,acting unforeseen commercial or residential development and if such develop-
ment induces greater runoff and thereby renders a culvert or storm sewer inadequat 
the Department may become subservient to private or corporate owners and be re-
quired to reconstruct the culvert, 
Likewise, the sinking of water in private wells -- near excavation, blasting, 
etc, -- incurs presumed fault. Malfunction of existing sewers or the creation 
of seepages usually involves presumed fault. 
A. 0. Neiser, State Highway Engineer 
April 1, 1970 
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In summary, it seems that the most reliable guiding principle to follow 
from the standpoint of engineering design is to acquire the right to alter 
drainage when necessary alterations are likely to cause flooding, erosion, o
r 
other damage. In some situations where damage is unavoidable, the damage may 
be compensable -- as damage to a severed remainder of a parcel or merely as 
damage to an abutting owner. Easements, temporary or permanent, may be ob-
tained for channel improvements essential to drainage and to the welfare of 
the roadway. In instances where the attendant damages are likely to be recur-
rent, either the affected lands should be acquired through fee-simple purchases 
or a permanent easement obtained. If the design headwater elevation for a 
culvert is such that it backs water onto private lands, a permanent easement 
might be acquired as a safeguard against future liabilities. To obtain title 
to all abutting lands likely to be affected by highway drainage burdens the 
Department for additional maintenance and deprives private owners of limited 
but perhaps profitable use of lands, 
The report submitted herewith documents and directs attention to some 
matters associated with the design of drainage facilities and the possible 
liabilities incurred thereby, Messrs. McLellan and Fox were law students at 
the University of Kentucky while employed part-time in the Division of Research, 
Mr. McLellan was also a graduate engineer, formerly employed elsewhere by the 
Department. 
No further research effort on this subject is planned at this time, 
tted, 
Jas. H. Havens 
Director of Research 
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DRAINAGE OF SURFACE WATERS 
Drainage laws may be classified many ways. One of these is according to 
liability, that is, either public or private 1iability. Since this paper is 
more concerned with the former, it will deal primarily with that area which 
includes municipal, county and state liability resulting from the drainage of 
surface waters. 
There are two general types of surface waters (1). The first is diffused 
surface waters, derived from falling rain or melting snow. The essential char-
acteristics of diffused surface waters are a short-lived flow that is not 
confined to the channel of a legal watercourse or concentrated in a lake or 
pond (2). The second of these two types is surface waters flawing in a well-
defined watercourse. The essential characteristics of such a watercourse are 
a channel with definite bed and banks and a current of water; however, the water 
in such a channel need not flow year round (3). Both types of surface waters 
will be considered in this discussion. 
In the United States there are three basic rules of law applied to diffused 
surface waters: 1) the civil law rules, 2) the common enemy rule or common law, 
and 3) the reasonable use rule. Kentucky, in the case of Johnson v. Marcum (4), 
established its use of the civil law rule and is so listed in publications giv-
ing such a breakdown. 
Civil law is the system of jurisprudence held and administered in the 
Roman Empire, particularly as set forth in the compilation of Justinian and 
his successors. This is collectively known as the "Corpus Juris Civilis". 
Civil law is retained today i.n many geographical areas which were within the 
Roman Empire as well as areas which later were colonized by countries located 
in those geographical areas. The term is used in contradistinction to the com-
mon law of England and to the common law recognized in various other states. 
The terms Civil Law, Roman Law, and Roman Civil Law are synonymous and are the 
law of private rights. 
Under civil law, the owner of land at a higher elevation has the right to 
have diffused surface waters, flowing naturally upon his land, pass through 
natural channels of drainage onto or over a lower tract of land. When a person 
interferes with the natural flow of diffused surface waters and thereby causes 
harm to a neighboring landowner, he is subject to liability to that landowner. 
This rule has been modified to the extent, at least in most jurisdictions, that 
a landowner may make minor alterations in the natural flow where such alterations 
are necessary for the normal use and improvement of his land, even though the 
alterations may cause the diffused surface waters to flow onto adjoining lands 
in an unnatural manner. This modification was put into effect in the Kentucky 
case of Wallace v. Schneider (5), and is not, as some writers have claimed, an 
application of the common enemy doctrine (6). Highway authorities, incidental 
to the power to lay out, construct and maintain highways, have the power to 
drain diffused surface waters from the highways and to construct ditches and 
culverts to do so. This authority is, in general, a discretionary authority 
regarding the adoption of a particular system of drainage. Being discretionary, 
the courts exercise no control except when a private right of a citizen is invaded. 
Common law, as distinguished from Roman Law or modern civil law and other 
systems, is that body of law and juristic theory which was originated, developed 
and formulated and is administered in England, particularly the unwritten law 
of England, It has been retained among most of the areas peopled by Anglo-Saxon 
stock. The common law comprises those principles and rules of action, relating 
to the government and security of persons and property, which derive their 
authority solely from usages and customs of former times, or from the judgments 
and decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming and enforcing such usages and 
customs. As such, it differs from law created by the enactment of legislatures. 
Under the common law rule or common enemy rule, diffused surface waters 
are considered a common enemy; and, as long as his intentions were not malicious, 
a landowner had unlimited legal privileges to interfere with the flow of diffused 
surface waters on his land, This was regardless of harm,,which may have occurred 
as a result of operations on his lancf. to prevent diffused' surface waters from 
reaching his land without being required to take into account the consequences 
to surrounding landowners, The surrounding landowners had a corresponding right 
to protect their own property in a similar manner. 
The reasonable use rule does not come entirely from either the civil law 
or common law. Rather, it is a result of judicial construction (interpretation) 
over the years, taking the better points from both. Simply stated, the posses-
sor of land is not privileged to deal with diffused surface water drainage in 
any manner he so chooses. The landowner, providing he is acting in good faith 
to effect a reasonable use of his land, may drain his land of diffused surface 
waters and cast them upon other land if 1) there is a reasonable necessity for 
the drainage, 2) reasonable care is taken to avoid unnecessary injury to other 
land, 3) the benefit accruing to the land drained outweighs the gravity of the 
harm to the other land, and 4) a reasonable and feasible drainage system is 
adopted, utilizing the natural drainage system where possible. 
In Kentucky this power to provide drainage on highways and roads lies, 
by statute, with the county (7). However, it would seem that this statute is 
a holdover from the time when counties were responsible for the major portion 
of the highway function, Today, the major portion of that function lies almost 
entirely with the Commonwealth, through its Department of Highways. Therefore, 
rules of law, opinions, and decisions discussed below which involve counties 
would seem to be just as applicable today for the Commonwealth as they were for 
the counties at the time when they were rendered, 
Generally, under the incident Power mentioned above, highway authorities 
may drain diffused surface water from' a highway onto abutting land. Following 
the modification adopted in Wallace v. Schneider (5), this would seem true even 
though it would cause the diffused surface waters to flow more freely over or 
onto the abutting land. Indeed, in York v. Pike Co., the court held that prudent 
construction of a highway did not depend on the quantity of water thrown onto 
the plaintiff's land, but on what was necessary to properly drain the highway (8). 
However, this power to construct facilities for drainage may be limited by the 
deed conveying the right of way for the highway. It is after this deed has passed 
and the abutting property owner suffers damages from drainage to property not 
included in the original deed that a problem arises. The question then becomes 
one of what are the remedies available to the property owner and what liability 
has the Department of Highways incurred, 
-2· 
There. are two methods by which liability may attach regarding the Highway
 
Department, The first is through the power of eminent domain; the second
, tres-
pass, 
Eminent domain is defined as " ..• the power to take private property for 
public use" (9), Section 13 of Kentucky's Constitution states in part, ",,.nor 
shall any man's property be taken or applied to public use .•• without just com-
pensation being previously made to him." Further, in Section 242, the C
onsti-
tution provides that the Department ".,,shall. make just compensatic..t for property 
taken, injured or destroyede~ .. " 
The question, herein, is what constitutes a taking of property. Of cour
se, 
the primary acquisition of rights of way for construction, reconstructio
n, or 
repairs comes within this "taking". But what of incidents which occur af
ter 
the initial acquisition and after the completion of the work for which th
e prop-
erty was acquired? More specifically, what does "taking" include where s
urface 
water is concerned? 
Considering first surface waters in natural streams, the court in Keck v.
 
Hafley (10) said that under Sections 13 and 242 of the Constitution, the State 
is not immune from suit if it fails to initiate a condemnation proceeding
. 
The court went on to observe that such a suit was in the nature of conde
mnation 
proceedings in reverse. The facts of this case were briefly as follows: 
In the 
construction of a highway next to the landowner's property, the channel o
f a 
stream was changed so as to divert the natural flow of water and cause it
 to 
flood his land and crops. The court, in its opinion, found that the floo
ding 
occurred even during normal rainfall. This resulted in the erosion of to
p soil, 
creating gullies, and in general destroyed the use of the property for th
e pur-
pose of cultivation. The court then ruled that the impairment in such us
e of 
the land constituted a "taking" of it. 
This, of course, raises the question of how could the process of damaging
 
be a "taking". This had been answered previously in Bader v. Jefferson C
ounty 
(11). There the court said, under Sections 13 and 242 of the Constitution re-
quiring compensation, that, though there was no actual taking in the sen
se of 
reducing to possession, if there was a physical invasion of the property 
or 
damage to it by diversion of water or flooding, then there was a taking a
nd the 
owner must be compensated. 
Another Kentucky case concerning water in a stream is ~her County v. 
~ (12). In that case, a county had allowed debris to accumulate against a 
highway bridge, This resulted in flooding of the owner's land and destru
ction 
of a warehouse and the washing away of soil. The court held this to be a
 "tak-
ing" of property and that the county was prohibited hy Section 242 of the
 
Constitution from doing so without just compensation. 
In Department of Highways v. Corey (13), the court held that the location 
and construction of a culvert in a stream caused damage to a property ow
ner's 
land and that the damage was of sufficient nature as to amount to a takin
g of 
the property. The court went on to say that, though the State is immune 
to suit 
because of sovereign immunity, this immunity was waived because the takin
g was 
without just compensation as required by Sections 13 and 242 of the Kentucky 
Constitution. Investigation in other jurisdictions reveals that in Missouri 
the law is the same. There, in the case of State Highway Commission v. 
Goodson, 
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the court said that where land is flooded or its drainage prevented by obstruct-ing or diverting the flow of water, there is in general a taking of property and that such taking entitles the owner to compensation (14). So, too, in Idaho, 
which, as Kentucky, is a civil rule jurisdiction. In Renninger v. State, the 
court held that where the state, in constructing a new highway bridge across 
a stream, had permitted a portion of the construction to act as a dam obstruct-ing the natural flow of water; and such an act resulted in the taking of land (15). 
This same attitude prevails when diffused surface waters are involved. In Commonwealth v. Kelley (16), the Highway Department, because of negligent 
management of a highway and culverts, caused diffused surface water to overflow 
onto and injure the owner's landG The court, in its decision, said that an interference with the legally prote.cted use of land which destroys that use or places a substantial and additional''burden on the owner to maintain the use is 
a "taking" of his property. Previously, in Moore v. Lawrence County (17), the 
court said that a reasonably apparent injury to land that resulted from the ditching of a county road is "injured" within the meaning of Section 242 of the Constitution. The ditching had been done in such a manner as to discharge accu-
mulated water onto the property in a greater quantity than the prior natural flow. A municipality (18) was held liable, also under Section 242 of the Con-
stitution, where the city established an alleyway without providing drainage. This lack of drainage caused surface water to back up onto the owner's premises. The case of Bader v. Jefferson County (11), also referred to diffused surface 
water as well as surface water in a natural course. In City of Danville v. Smallwood (19), the city was constructing a storm sewer and work had ceased 
temporarily. During a rainstorm, water was unnaturally diverted onto the owner's property causing his dwelling to collapse. The court, in ruling for the owner, 
said that this constituted a "taking" of the property and, under Section 242 of the Constitution, the owner was entitled to compensation. 
A recent case, Commonwealth v. Robbins (20), held that, when surface water is unreasonably diverted from its natural course of drainage and is cast upon land onto which that surface water had not previously flowed, the person or per-
sons causing the diversion are liable for resulting damage. Continuing, the 
court said that the injury complained of was not authorized by the original deed 
and that the measure of damages is the same as in condemnation cases. 
The above case seems to adopt the reasonable use rule. A very important decision, Klutey v. Department of Highways, was rendered recently by the Court 
of Appeals using this rule. It was ."c~ecided on December .8, 1967, by a 5-2 vote. Both the majority and dissenting opinions are given in Appendix A. The facts in the case are very similar to those found in the Roundtree case (28). The distinguishing point and the point on which it appears that the court made its decision is that, from the facts, no new watershed was tapped, as was the case in the Roundtree case. The importance of the Klutey case cannot be overlooked 
and is the reason for the inclusion of the opinion in its· entirety. The reason-
able use rule was next applied by the Court of Appeals in the case of Commonwealth 
v. Baird, on May 20, 1969. This decision is included in Appendix B because it is the first application of the reasonable use rule since it was adopted in the Klutey case. 
Not all cases, however, hold that mere diversion of water onto adjoining 
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land is a "taking". In the early case of York v. Pike County, the court stated 
that a "taking" did not depend upon the quantity of water thrown onto the land, 
but on what was necessary to properly drain the highway. However, later in 
Department of Highways v. McKinney (21), the court ruled that the Highway Depart-
ment had no right to divert water from its natural course and cast it upon the 
land of an adjacent property owner. 
Supporting the York case (8), is the California case of Department of Public 
Works v. Lindskog, There the court held that the state could obstruct the flow 
of surface waters, not running in a natural channel from owner's land onto a 
highway, without making compensation for resulting damage (22). 
Contrary views, supporting McKinney (21), are found in the South Dakota 
case of Bogue v. Clay County and in two Georgia cases, Tift County v. Smith and 
Sheehan v. Richmond County, In the South Dakota case a county had, by means of 
a drainage ditch, collected surface water ih large and unnatural quantities and 
discharged them onto the owner's land. There they remained to infiltrate and 
evaporate, The court ruled that this constituted a "taking" of property (23). 
In the Sheehan case the court ruled that the state may not channel or cast large 
quantities of collected surface water from highways onto adjacent owner's land 
without just compensation for resulting damages (24). In Tift, it simply ruled 
that a p~operty owner could recover damages resulting when highway improvements 
caused water to flow onto his land (25). 
The second area of liability (i.e, trespass) is not as clearly defined as 
the first. The doctrine of sovereign immunity restricts the remedies the land-
owner has for damages resulting from trespass quare clausum freight or trespass 
qcf. This is the action for damages for an unlawful entry or trespass upon the 
plaintiff's land. It should be noted that the liabilities and remedies dis-
cussed above resulted primarily from the type of trespass known as a continuing 
trespass, which amounted to a "taking". However, trespass qcf is ordinarily a 
trespass occurring once and, while sufficient to cause damage, may not be suffi-
cient to constitute a "taking11 • 
When then, if the damage is not a "taking", is the Highway Department liable 
and what are the remedies available to the landowner? First the landowner may 
seek damages in the manner set forth in Chapter 44 of the Kentucky Revised Stat-
utes. This chapter established a Board of Claims to evaluate claims against the 
Commonwealth. A landowner whose property has been damaged as a result· of drain-
age from a highway presents his claim to the Board, This claim must be presented 
to the Board within one year of the time the damage shall have accrued. The 
limit of damages which the Board may award is $10,000, exclusive of interest and 
costs. Either the landowner or the Highway Department may appeal the decision of 
the Board to Circuit Court and then to the Court of Appeals. The Board of Claims 
Act does not define causes for action against the Commonwealth, but its effect is 
to waive the defense of sovereign immunity by ?roviding a remedy for a particular 
character of claim. To come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board of 
Claims, the injury must result from negligence. If there is an absence of negli-
gence, then the landowner's remedy lies either in eminent domain or an injunction. 
In Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Smith, the court held that it was for 
the Board of Claims to determine whether the condition could be alleviated at a 
reasonable cost without damages to the property owner (26). In this case the 
property owner's yard had been flooded with diffused surface water from a high-
way as a result of the water not being channeled into a drain. 
-5-
The last remedy available to the property owner is an injunction. Unless 
another and exclusive remedy is provided by statute, an injunction may be allowec 
to protect the landowner. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in Anderson v. State 
Highway Commission of Kentucky, recognized this right of a property owner to en-join agents of the State from injuring or destroying his land (27). The court, 
in dismissing the Commonwealth's contention that this was a suit against the 
State and hence void under the doctrine .of sovereign immunity, stated that the 
State may be sued by a private citizen to restrain the commission of a contem-
plated injury or to compel to perform acts essential to protect the property or 
right of individuals. This is when the suit, whatever its nature, will not do 
more than restrain the commission of a wrong or compel the performance of a duty, 
In other words, where the suit directly concerns an act of the Department, whethE 
of commission or omission, injunctive relief is available. Later in Department < 
Highways v. McKinney (21), the court reaffirmed this position. There the court 
affirmed an injunction requiring the Commonwealth to close a drainage culvert an< 
clean out a ditch where the nuisance was shown to be in excess of $3000 and the 
cost of abatement $200. 
An important case covering the matter of injunction was Commonwealth, 
Department of Highways v. Roundtree (28). The original action was by the Common-
wealth to enjoin Roundtree from obstructing the drainage of diffused surface 
waters from a catch basin onto his land, Roundtree, in his counterclaim, asked 
for an injunction to prevent the continued maintenance of the catch basin. Upon 
appeal the Court of Appeals, in affirming an injunction in favor of Roundtree, 
stated that, where the surface waters were from sources beyond the scope of the 
natural drainage easement and in the absence of a proscriptive right to discharge 
this additional water onto the adjoining land, the continued maintenance of the 
catch basin could be properly enjoined. In addition, the court held that Round-
tree could recover for damages already done as well as obtain the injunction 
against continued maintenance of the drainage. The court said that damages repre 
sented recovery for a temporary use, not a permanent easement. 
However, the property owner cannot seek both injunctive relief and damages 
for permanent taking. That is, he must elect either to recover his damages under 
eminent domain or injunctive relief (10). 
In review, the Department of Highways may be liable for damages resulting 
from flooding caused by the diversion of either diffused surface waters or sur-
face waters flowing in a stream. The property owner may seek his remedy either 
in a suit of condemnation in reverse under the theory of eminent domain or by 
making a claim against the Department through the statutory provisions of the 
Board of Claims or by seeking injunctive relief for the abatement of the invasion 
of his property. As an added note, the course charted by the Court in Klutey 
seems to be entirely different from the previous one laid down through the years 
and, as such, should be watched in the future. 
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tion for property taken or injured before the taking or injury. A party, to 
whose property a reasonably apparent injury has resulted from the ditching of 
a county road in such a way as to discharge accumulated water upon his property 
in a greater quantity than the natural flow, is "injured" within the meaning of 
Section 242, and the County is liable for the injury from the increase of bur-
den. 
18. Ewing v. City of Louisville, 140 Ky. 726, 131 SW 1016 (1910). Where 
the city established an alleyway without a culvert or drain, which caused sur-
face water to backup ·onto the plaintiff's premises, it is liable under the 
direct provision of Constitution Section 242, which allows compensation for 
property injured or destroyed, as well as that taken for public use. 
19. City of Danville v. Smallwood, Ky., 247 SW 2nd 516. Owners were en-
titled to compensation for taking of their property where the city constructed 
a storm sewer which caused water to be unnaturally diverted across owner's yard. 
20. Commonwealth v. Robbins, Ky., 421 SW 2nd 820 (1967). Where surface 
water is unreasonably diverted from its natural course of drainage and is cast 
upon land onto which it had not previously flowed, the person or persons caus-
ing the diversion are liable for resulting damage. 
21. Department of Highways v. McKinney, 291 Ky. 1, 162 SW 2nd 179 (1942). 
The State Highway Department has no right to make any change in the construction 
or reconstruction of a road which would divert water from its natural course and 
cast it upon the land of an adjacent property owner, and any plan doing so is 
illegal. 
22. Department of Public Works v. Lindoskog, 16 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1961). The 
state could obstruct flow of surface waters, not running in a natural channel 
from plaintiff's land onto highway property, without making compensation for 
resulting damage. Plaintiff's statement that he had the right to have his sur-
face water received by the lower highway land (refused) in absence of reference 
to waters flowing in a natural channel. 
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23. Bogue v. Clay County, 75 SD, 140, 60 NH 2nd 2Hl (1953). Collecting 
surface waters by means of a drainage ditch and discharging them onto plain-
tiff's land in unusual and unnatural quantities, not into a natural water 
course, so that it remained to infiltrate and evaporate constitutes a "taking 11 • 
24. Tift County v. Smith, 107 Ga. App. 140, 129 SE 2nd 172 (1962). Prop-
erty owners could recover damages from a county "tVhere a highway improvement 
caused wat~r to flow over the abutting land. 
25. Sheehan v. Richmond County, 100 Ga. App. 496, 111 SE 2nd '>24 (1959). 
The state may not channel or cast large quantities of collected surface water 
from a highway upon land at a lower elevation adjoining the highway without 
just compensation for resulting damage. 
26. Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Smith, Ky., 388 SH 2nd 362 
(1965). A deed of right of way for construction of road and grading did not 
bar grantor's claim arising out of flooding occasioned allegedly by negligent 
failurP to continue or extend a curb along the road which would steer water 
more effectively into a concrete drain or flume and thus avoid flooding. 
27. Anderson v. Highway Commission, 252 Ky. 696, 68 SH 2nd 5 (1934). 
Landowner's suit to enjoin state highway commission from diverting waters of 
a creek so as to flood owner 1 s lands was held not a "suit against commonwealth" 
so as to be not maintainable without its consent. 
28. Department of Highways v. Roundtree, Ky., 372 SW 2nd 804. Continued 
maintenance of a highway catch basin which discharged onto lower adjoining land 
surface waters from sources beyond the scope of the natural drainage easement 
was properly enjoined in the absence of showing of prescriptive right to dis-
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This action was brought by the Commonwealth to enJ01n appellants from 
maintaining embankments on their property which diverted the flow of water 
from two drainage pipes under a new highway constructed in the City of Hender-
son. Appellants counterclaimed and sought an injunction against the Common-
wealth. The Chancellor found in favor of the latter. 
Appellants owned a 70-acre tract. The Commonwealth condemned an 8-acre 
strip running from north to south for the construction of a limited access 
highway. This left a landlocked area of 8 acres on the east side of the high-
way. When it was constructed, two drainage pipes were built to carry water 
from the east side to the west side. One was 24 inches in diameter and the 
other 18 inches. Water flowing through these pipes was cast onto appellants' 
land on the west. Appellants claim that by virtue of the accelerated flow 
deep ditches were cut in their property and a flooding condition was created. 
To stem the tide appellants built embankments opposite the western open-
ings of these two drainage pipes, thereby backing water up on the highway. 
It is these embankments the Chancellor ordered removed. It is appellants' 
contention that the Commonwealth had no right to cast this surface water on 
their land through the drainage pipes and they requested an injunction com-
pelling the Commonwealth to channel the flow in a different direction. 
There is a sharp issue of fact as to whether, prior to the construction 
of the highway, surface waters naturally drained from land on the east to ap-
pellants' property in the area where the 24-inch pipe is located. Appellants' 
evidence was that there was no east-west natural drainage at this point. On 
the other hand, witnesses for the Commonwealth testified that prior to the con-
struction of the highway there was a drainage ditch ranging from one to four 
feet in depth at this point and that an area of approximately 8 acres to the 
east drained onto appellants' land. On the basis of testimony and topograph-
ical and engineering maps the Chancellor found there had been a natural flow of 
surface water onto appellants' land at this point. Since there was substantial 
credible evidence to support this finding, we cannot say it was clearly erro-
neous. 
With respect to the 18-inch pipe, admittedly the natural drainage at that 
point was from east to west on a gentle slope. However, it is clear that the 
drainage pipe substantially accelerated the flow. The same may be said about 
the 24-inch pipe. It may be pointed out that as a result of appellants' pro-
tests, the Commonwealth partially sealed the eastern end of the 24-inch drainage 
pipe so that instead of draining an area of 8 acres it now accommodates a flow 
from an area of something over one acre. 
On the theory that there was no natural drainage onto appellants' land 
at the point of the 24-inch pipe, appellants contend the Commonwealth has changed 
the direction of the natural flow and has in effect tapped additional territory 
and subjected their property to an additional servitude. The finding of the 
Chancellor with respect to the natural drainage course answers that argument. 
The additional argument is made, however, that the Commonwealth had no 
right with either pipe to so accelerate the flow of water as to cause the serious 
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damage of which appellants complain. Their evidence was to the effect they had 
never had a drainage problem before but after the highway was constructed the 
discharge from the 24-inch pipe caused a flooding condition and the discharge 
from the 18-inch pipe was cutting a deep gorge through their land. The Chan-
cellor apparently took the view that since the Commonwealth was not tapping an 
additional source of surface water, it had the right to accelerate the flow by 
the construction of drainage pipes without regard to the damage caused, The 
Chancellor also iutimated that in the prior condemnation suit appellants had 
been compensated for the potential water damage that would be caused by the 
construction of the highway, a matter we will discuss later in this opinion). 
Reliance was placed upon Wallace v. Schneider, 310 Ky. 17, 219 SW 2nd 977. The 
difficult question presented, which has both legal and equitable aspects, re-
quires a re-examination of surface water rights in Kentucky. 
He will assume (as do the parties) that the Commonwealth stands in the 
position of an adjoining property owner. The conflicting rights of such parties 
at an earlier time led to the development of two doctrines which were almost 
diametrically opposed, Under the "common enemy" doctrine each landowner had 
the rights to dispose of surface water on his land in any manner he saw fit, 
regardless of the adverse consequences to his neighbor. Under the "civil law" 
doctrine, while the lower owner was bound to accept natural drainage from the 
upper owner, the upper owner had no right, by artificial means, to change or 
increase the normal flow. It was soon found that the strict application of 
either doctrine would often cause an inequitable result as between the parties, 
and neither theory took into account the socially desirable uses of the property 
or the extent of damage one property owner might cause his neighbor. For this 
reason exceptions and modifications gradually infused the doctrines and there 
evolved a flexibility in their application. For a history of the developments 
in this field, attention is called to 59 A,L,R, 2nd 421. 
In one of our earlier Kentucky cases, Pickerill v. City of Louisville, 
125 Ky. 213, 100 SH 873, we purported to adopt the "civil law" doctrine, al-
though the opinion recognizes that formerly the "common law" ("common enemy") 
principle had been applied. That case involved a situation (which naturally 
develops under the "common enemy" concept), quite similar to the one before us, 
where the upper property owner ditches his land to rid himself of surface water 
and the lower owner, to avoid the consequences, throws the water back by obstruc-
ting the flow with an artificial embankment. In the opinion we stated the rule 
to be (page 876 SW): 
"**'~the owner of the upper ground has no right to make excavations, 
barriers, or drains upon his ground by which the flow of surface water 
is diverted from its natural channel and a new channel made on the lower 
ground, nor can he collect into one channel waters usually flowing off 
into his neighbor's land by several channels, and thereby increase the 
flow upon the lower ground." 
The same principle was followed in Gott v. Franklin, 307 Ky. 466, 211 SW 
2nd 680, where we held the plaintiff had no right by artificial means (the til-
ing of a garden) to collect water and cause it to flow onto neighboring property 
in accelerated and larger quantities. Here again we substantially applied the 
"civil law" doctrine~ 
The following year the case of \Vallace v. Schneider, 310 Ky. 17, 219 SI.J 
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2nd 977, was decided. 
the land, built roads, 
water onto plaintiff's 
SW 2nd}: 
There the defendant, in establishing a subdivision, graded 
gutters and sewers, and thereby accelerated the flow of 
property. The applicable law was thus stated (page 980 
"The owner of the dominant estate may drain and ditch his land for 
the purpose of ridding it of surface water even to the extent of building 
sewers, gutters, and culverts without liability to the owner of the serv-
ient estate, even though such methods of ridding his own property of sur-
face water causes such water to be accelerated in its flow onto the 
servient estate, so long as he does not tap additional territory from 
which surface waters otherwise would not have flowed through the natural 
drain in which the ditches, gutters, sewers, or culverts are constructed," 
(Emphasis added} 
This would appear to be a modified "common enemy" doctrine. 
In the later case of Rutherford v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., Ky., 
243 SW 2nd 1017, the defendant railroad company had dug a new ditch, or widened 
an old one, on its right-of-way, whereby a greatly accelerated flow of water 
was channeled through a 24-inch culvert emptying into a. ditch on property adjoin-
ing the plaintiff's land and caused a flooding condition. We held the defendant 
could not unreasonably subject plaintiff's property to a servitude involving more 
than the absorption of the natural flow of water, and the owner of the lower 
estate could recover damages from the owner of the upper estate (page 1018 SW 
2nd): 
"***if the latter unreasonably changes the natural course of the 
water or causes it to collect and be cast upon the lower estate in an 
unnatural volume or in an unusual or swift stream; *** or if he collects 
in one channel waters usually flowing onto his neighbor's land by sev-
eral channels and thereby increases the flow on the lower ground," 
(Emphasis added) 
It will be noted this opinion uses the terms "unreasonablY~ "unnatural" 
and "unusual". Our prior opinions had not made reference to such factors, 
Recognition of their significance established a middle ground principle between 
the "common enemy" doctrine (which favors the upper owner) and the "civil law" 
doctrine (which favors the lower owner). In the recent case of Commonwealth, 
Department of Highways v, Robbins, Ky., 421 SW 2nd 820, we determined that the 
Commonwealth had "unreasonably" diverted surface water from its natural course 
of drainage. Thus in Kentucky we have developed a "reasonable use" rule, which 
is followed in other states, See Bassett v. Salisburg Mfg. Co., 43 NH 569, 82 
Am Dec 179; Bush v. Rochester, 191 Minn. 591, 255 NW 256; Armstrong v, Francis 
Corp., 20 NJ 320, 120 A. 2nd 4, 59 A.L.R, 2nd 413; and Weinberg v. Northern 
AIBlska Development Corp., Alaska, 384 P 2nd 450, 
In substance the rule balances the reasonableness of the use by the upper 
owner against the severity of damage to the lower owner, and is identical with 
the principle we had adopted in determining the existence of a nuisance. In 
Louisville Refining Company v. Mudd, Ky., 339 SW 2nd 181, we said: 
"*** we accept the proposition that the existence of a nuisance 
must be ascertained on the basis of two broad factors, neither of which 
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may in any case be the sole test to the exclusion of the other: l) the 
reasonableness of the defendant's use of his property, and 2) the grav-
ity of harm to the complainante" 
In fact, our problem is a nuisance problem. See Pickerill v. City of 
Louisville, 125 Ky. 213, 100 SH ?73; Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. 
Cochrane, Ky., 397 SH 2nd 155. 
The difficulty, of course, lies in determining and applying the tests of 
reasonableness. To begin with, the lower owner has the servient estate and he 
must accept drainage from his neighboring upper owner. Also it must be recog-
nized that any artificial utilization of land by the latter may, in some degree, 
affect the natural drainage on adjoining lower lands. Acceleration of the flm< 
of surface water onto his lower neighbor often results when the upper m.ner 
modifies his drainage system. Our problem is the extent to which this may be 
done without liability. 
In Enderson v. Kelehen, Minn., 32 NW 2nd 286, 289, the principle involved 
and the pertinent considerations are thus set forth: 
"*** the rule is that in effecting a reasonable use of his land for 
a legitimate purpose of a landowner, acting in good faith, may drain his 
land of surface waters and cast them as a burden upon the land of another, 
although such drainage carries with it some waters which would otherwise 
have never gone that way but would have remained on the land until they 
were absorbed by the soil or evaporated in the air, if 
(a) There is a reasonable necessity for such drainage; 
(b) If reasonable care be taken to avoid unnecessary injury to the 
land receiving the burden; 
(c) If the utility or benefit accruing to the land drained reason-
ably outweighs the gravity of the harm resulting to the land 
receiving the burden; and 
(d) If, where practicable, it is accomplished by reasonably im-
proving and aiding the normal and natural system of drainage 
according to its reasonable carrying capacity, or if, in the 
absence of a practicable natural drain, a reasonable and fea-
sible artificial drainage system is adopted." 
He believe this constitutes a sound approach to the problem and obviously 
requires consideration of all relevant factors and special circumstances in each 
particular case. 
Though appellants argue to the contrary, we do not have in this case the 
tapping of a new watershed, as appeared in Commonwealth, Department of Highways, 
v. Roundtree. Kv., 372 SH 2nd 804, and was referred to in the above quotation 
from the Schneider case (1), Hhile the Commonwealth actually tapped a new source 
in constructing a median strip catch basin, where was a substitution of this sur-
face water for that formerly draining from an 8-acre area through the 24-inch 
pipe, and from a practical standpoint the tapping of the new source did not itself 
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increase the volume of water flowing toward appellants' lando The nnrro\,' quc~­
tion involves the extent to which the Commonwealth, by an artificial drnitHl.;:t' 
system, may lawfully accelerate the flow of surface water onto appellants 
1 Ltn~l 
in a natural drainage direction~ 
If the Commonwealth was creating a nuisance, it was taking an easencnt 
over appellants' land for drainage purposes and the landowner would be entitled
 
to compensation therefor as allowed in Bm·Jling Green-l,Jarren County Airp
ort Ed. 
v. Long, Ky., 364 SW 2nd 167, or equitable relief as upheld in Pike Count~ 
Board of Education v. Belfry Coal Corp., Ky., 346 SH 2nd 37. If, in the liccht 
of all the circumstances, the Commonwealth \vas not creating a nuisance, it H<-l.s 
entitled to the relief granted. 
Hhile the Chancellor relied upon the Schneider op~n~on (2) (which has been 
somewhat qualified as herein pointed out), his opinion convinces us that he 
took into consideration 'those factors which we have heretofore indicated were 
relevant in determining the respective rights of the parties. Of significance 
was the public necessity for the construction of this highway and the engineer-
ing necessity for this type of drainage system according to accepted standards.
 
Cf. Louisville and Jefferson County Air Bd. v. Porter,_ Ky., 397 SH 2nd 146. 
Another consideration was the action taken by the Commonwealth in good faith 
prior to this suit to ameliorate the situation by sealing off a substantial 
source of flow through the 24-inch drainage pipe. 
Of perhaps greater significance was the prior condemnation suit bet\veen 
the parties. In that proceeding appellants were awarded $30,000 damages when 
the Commonwealth acquired a strip through their land for the construction of 
the highway. When that trial was held, the new road and the two culverts had 
been constructed. One of the appellants testified to the drainage condition 
created and pointed out how it was damaging his property. In the closing argu-
ment his counsel commented on this element of damage. The Chancellor therefore
 
properly assumed (as he noted in his opinion) that the $30,000 award for the 
land taken included compensation for the accelerated flow created by these 
drainage pipes (3). 
In our opinion, the Chancellor properly balanced the equities between the 
parties and we find no error in his judgment. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Williams, C.J., and Hill, Palmore, Milliken and Steinfeld, J.J., concur. 
Dissenting opinion by Judge Osborne, in which Judge Montgomery joins. 
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE OSBORNE 
It appears that the holding of the trial court which is affirmed by the 
majority opinion herein is to the effect that the dominant tenement is free to 
release surface water upon the servient tenement in any quantity or with any 
force that it chooses so long as an additional source of water is not tapped. 
The same applies to the acceleration of flow. In affirming this revolutionary
 
principle the majority opinion turns to the courts of Minnesota for authority. 
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Enderson v. Kelehen, Minn., 32 N.W. 2nd 286. 
The respective rights of property holders as they relate to the use and disposition of surface waters greatly differ in the several states. The reason for this being that problems pertaining to surface water vary with the differ-
ence in rainfall, soil texture, steepness of slope and many other factors. What is a problem in one state is not a problem in another. For this reason, the law of Arizona would differ from the law of Florida, etc. Over a period 
of years, each state has developed its set of rules controlling the use and disposition of surface water. We have done this in Kentucky and have adopted 
what is known as the "civil law doctrine" which holds that while the lower 
owner is bound to accept natural drainage from the upper owner, the upper owner has no right by artificial means to chaqge or increase the normal flow of water 
or to accelerate the flow at any one point in such manner as to unreasonably damage the lower owner. 
This is a well-settled principle in this state and well defined though there is some unfortunate language in a few isolated cases which cannot be 
avoided when the question is written on by so many different individuals over 
such a long period of time. The law generally is well settled. No later than last week the principles enunciated in the above cases were reaffirmed by this 
court. Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Robbins, Ky. 421 SW 2nd 820. The majority opinion herein can do nothing but inject confusion and consterna-tion. 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. Judge Montgomery joins in this dissent. 
1. Wallace v. Schneider, 310 Ky. 17, 219 SW 2nd 977. 
2. Wallace v. Schneider, 310 Ky. 17, 219 SW 2nd 977. 
3. When the Commonwealth is actually taking an easement for drainage or 
other purposes, the pleadings and the judgment should so provide. See Bowling Green-Warren County Airport Bd. v. Long., Ky., 364 SW 2nd 167. 
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G. C. Baird and wife recovered judgment against the Commonwealth, Depart-
ment of Highways, in the amount of $3,000, for damages to the Baird property 
found by a jury to have resulted from surface water the flow of which was 
accelerated by construction of an I-highway on a right-of-way adjoining the 
Baird property. The department has appealed, asserting various grounds of 
error, the first of which is that the department's motion for a directed ver-
dict should have been sustained because the evidence did not establish any 
basis for liability on the part of the department. 
The Baird property consisted of a small parcel of land on which was 
located an upholstery shop, It lay down grade from a valley into which rain-
water flowed from surrounding hills. Prior to construction of the highway 
the water flowed down the valley through a small natural drain which continued 
along 'one side of the Baird property to a culvert under the highway on which 
the Baird property fronted. The evidence was that before the construction of 
the highway, the drain along the side of the Baird property handled the flow 
of surface waters with no difficulty and there had never been any overflow or 
flooding problem. 
The highway department acquired a right-of-way across the valley, adjoin-
ing the back line of the Baird property, for construction of an !-highway. 
The highway then was constructed, consisting of two double-lane roadways, each 
one resting on a 33-foot fill. The fills ran parallel to the back line of the 
Baird property and crossed at right angles the line of the old drain in the 
valley. To provide for the disposition of surface water the department installed 
a 42-inch culvert or tile running beneath both of the fills, along the line of 
the old drain, and terminating at the back line of the Baird property, so that 
the flow of the water would be from the mouth of the culvert or tile into the 
natural drain running along the side of the Baird property. In addition, the 
department constructed a concrete gutter running diagonally down the side of 
the fill nearest the Baird back line, and terminating at the same point as the 
culvert, so that water from the gutter also went into the natural drain along-
side the Baird property. 
The evidence for the Bairds was that the flow of water into the natural 
drain by the side of their property was so accelerated by the highway construc-
tion that the drain could not handle it; in times of heavy rains the surface 
water flooded through the upholstery shop, filling the floor with mud and 
damaging the equipment and supplies; and even in times of normal rains the sur-
face water seeped through the walls of the building and permeated the soil. 
Even the witnesses for the Commonwealth (except one whose testimony will be 
discussed at a later point herein) admitted that the flow of water coming from 
the culvert and gutter was too much for the natural drain to handle. The depart-
ment, after the instant suit was filed, endeavored to alleviate the problem by 
constructing a wooden dike near the end of the culvert, but it did not prove to 
be of any real benefit. 
The evidence as to damages (based on "before" and "after" values) was that 
the value of the Baird property before the water problem arose was around $3,800 
and its "after" value was only $1,000, making a difference of $2,800, In addition, 
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the Baird's proved damage to their personalty in the upholstery shop of several 
hundred dollars. As hereinbefore stated, the verdict was for $3,000, 
The Department of Highways rests its first argument on this appeal, that 
it was entitled to a directed verdict, on the proposition that an upper proper-
ty owner is not liable to the lower property owner for damage from increased 
flow of surface water unless the upper owner has tapped a new or additional 
watershed area. There was no proof of such tapping of a new or additional area 
in this case, so the department says it has no liability. The argument is with-
out merit, because the liability of the upper owner is not so limited, As 
clearly stated in Klutey v. Commonwealth, Department of Highways, Ky., 428 S.W, 2d 
766, the upper owner under certain conditions may be liable for acceleration 
of the flow of surface water without having tapped a new watershed. We are un-
able to comprehend how the department can argue (as it has) that Klutey limits 
liability to instances of tapping of new watersheds. 
The instant case was tried in the circuit court before Klutey was published. 
As a consequence, the instructions were prepared with the law being in the state 
of confusion related in the opinion of Klutey. The appellant complains of error 
in the instructions. However, as shall hereinafter be explained, we have conclu-
ded that the plaintiffs were entitled to a directed verdict on liability, so we 
need not consider whether there was error in the instructions. 
Under the rule stated in Klutey there is to be a balancing of factors, in 
main part consisting of weighing the reasonableness of the use of the land 
drained (or the "utility" of such use) against the gravity of the harm to the 
land receiving the burden of the drainage. In most instances this would be a 
matter for the jury, under instructions such as those outlined in George v. 
Standard Slag Company, Ky., 431 S.W. 2d 711. However, in cases of extremes, 
the liability or nonliability may be determined as a matter of law. 
In the instant case the damage to the Baird property was extreme - its 
gravity was severe. The evidence was that the water flooding has destroyed 
almost 75 percent of the value of the Baird property, We think that as a matter 
of law damage of such proportions must be considered to outweigh the admitted 
reasonableness or "utility" of the highway department's use of its right-of-way, 
In the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 828, Comment on Clause (c) p. 255, 
it is recognized that even where the defendant has done everything reasonably 
possible to avoid the damage he still may be liable if the "harm is too great", 
It may be argued that the result we reach here is inconsistent with that 
reached in Klutey, where the lower court denied injunctive relief to the owner 
of the lower land and this court affirmed, However, there are two clear dis-
tinctions between the two cases. First and foremost, here we have evidence of 
destruction of a major portion of the value of the lower land, whereas in 
Klutey the evidence did not show that there was damage of major proportions 
over and above the amount of compensation for water damage which the landowner 
had received in a prior condemnation award. Second, Klutey was a suit for an 
injunction, whereas the instant action is for damages. Obviously, the granting 
of an injunction might reverse the balance of harm, putting the upper owner in 
a position of detriment far outweighing the amount of damages to the lower owner. 
We come now to other grounds of error raised by the appellant. 
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It is contended that the damage to the Baird property was not in fact ex-
tensive or substantial; that the cause of the flooding could easily and cheaply 
have been remedied; and therefore not only is the award of $3,000 damages exces-
sive but the case should not have been submitted on the basis of difference in 
value but rather on the cost of remedying the situation. The argument is based 
on the testimony of one witness who said that the drain alongside the Baird 
property could have been cleaned out and an earth dike erected for about $100, 
and that this would solve the problem. It is our opinion, however, that the 
testimony of the witness was not cred.ible.. He was not an expert on drainage, 
but simply a real estate appraiser. The engineer witnesses for the highway de-
par.tment admitted that the culvert and gutter were emptying too much water into 
the drain for it to handle. The department had attempted without success to 
solve the problem by erecting a wooden dike. Had there been such a simple solu-
tion as suggested by the witness surely the Bairds would not have stood by and 
wa.tched their shop be inundated repeatedly nor would the highway department 
have subjected itself to this litigation. All of the circumstances militate 
against the credibility of the opinion of the witness in question. 
Finally, the appellant department argues that the Bairds were estopped to 
assert a claim for water damage by reason of the fact that compensation for 
potential water damage was included in the sum they had received for selling 
to the department, for right-of-way for the highway, part of an adjoining tract 
of land owned by them. The Bairds owned a residential lot adjoining the lot on 
which the upholstery shop was located, having acquired the two lots at different 
times. Part of the residential lot was needed for the highway right-of-way, and 
a condemnation suit was filed. After negotiations, the Bairds deeded the desired 
parcel to the department and an agreed order was entered dismissing the condem-
nation suit. Neither the deed nor the agreed order made any reference to >~ater 
damage. There was no testimony that potential water damage even was discussed. 
While there was some evidence that the Bairds were shown the plans for the high-
way, it was admitted even by the highway engineers that no ordinary person co~ld 
tell from those plans what the drainage treatment would be. On the ·estoppel 
point the case is comparable to Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Robbins, 
Ky., 421 s.w. 2d 820, and 1ve hold now, as we did there, that the circumstances 
were not such as to estop the owners. See also Commonwealth v. Litteral, Ky., 
319 s.w. 2d 458. 







Jarvis v. Cornett, Ky., 257 S,W, 2d 524 (1953) 
The owner of an upper estate may drain and ditch his land for purposes of 
carrying off surface water therefrom into natural channels by building sewers, 
gutters and culverts thereon, without liability to the m-mer of the lmver estate, 
even though such methods of ridding his property of surface water accelerate and 
increase flow of such water onto lower estate, so long as he does not tap water 
from additional watersheds or divert water from natural drains which otherwise 
would not have flowed onto the lower estate. 
Gott v. Franklin, 307 Ky. 466, 211 S.W. 2d 680 (1948) 
The lower of two adjoining properties is subject to natural flow of sur-
face water from the upper one; but the mmer of higher ground has no right to 
rid his land of surface water, naturally flowing through several channels, by 
excavation or collection thereof in artificial channels, thereby increasing 
flow onto lower ground, 
Cassell v. Gumes Investments, Inc., Ky., 383 S.W. 2d 128 (1964) 
Elimination of an artificial pond by upper owners, with resulting increase 
in flow of surface water across lands of lower owners did not entitle the latter 
to injunctive relief in absence of any action of upper owners diverting water 
which otherwise would not have flowed onto lower owner's land. 
Louisville and N.R. Co. v. Bush, Ky., 366 S,W. 2d 578 (1960) 
Though the railway company had recently dug a drainage ditch along the 
right of way to prevent accumulation of surface water from higher land and had 
constructed a new drain above an old clogged culvert through the railroad fill 
built many years previously, the company was not liable for damage caused by 
the flow of surface water from higher land through the new drain and across 
lower land, or had changed natural course of water, or caused it to accumulate 
and be cast upon lower land in an unnatural volume or unusual or swift stream. 
Comm. v. Cochrane, Ky., 397 s.w. 2d 155 (1965) 
Upper owner cannot use his land in such a way as to injure property of 
lmver riparian owner. 
Rutherford v. Louisville N.R. Co., Ky •. 243 S,W, 2d 1017 (1951) 
A lower estate is subject to servitude of natural flow of surface water 
from upper estates but owner of lower estate may recover damages if the owner 
of an upper estate unreasonably changes the natural course of water or causes 
it to collect and be cast upon lower estate in an unusual or swift stream, or 
if he diverts water from ordinary channels and casts it upon lower estate at 
a point which would not have been its natural destination, or if he collects 
in one channel waters usually flowing onto lower estate by several channels and 
thereby increases flow onto the lower estate. 
Lewallen v, Davenport, Ky., 255 S,W, 2d 16 (1953) 
The defendant, whose land adjoined but was lower than plaintiff's land, was 
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was liable for damages caused by water backed onto plaintiff's land by a fill 
built by defendant to prevent the flow onto his land of water which had been 
diverted across plaintiff's land by reconstruction of a state highway. 
Newport News and N.U. Co. v. Wilson, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 262, 27 s.w. 809 (1894) 
Onemay lawfully drain his land into a natural water course even if by so 
doing a lower proprietor is injured by the increased flow. 
Franz v. Jacobs, 183 Ky. 647, 210 s.w. 163 (1919) 
An upper proprietor has an easement in the land of the lower proprietor 
for the escape from his land of both surface water and that running in natural 
streams. The lower proprietor may not interfere with this right. An upper 
proprietor cannot collect surface water into a volume and empty it upon the 
lower proprietor, nor can he by such means augment the flow of a natural stream, 
so as to damage his neighbor below. 
Kraver v. Smith, 156 Ky. 674, 177 S.W. 286 
A riparian owner may make any use of the water which is beneficial to him-
self, including the use thereof for stock purposes, so long as he does not 
inflict any substantial injury to those on the stream below him. 
Smith v. Wathen, 156 Ky. 820, 162 S,W. 88 (1914) 
Landowners on a natural stream of a watercourse, which furnishes the 
natural drainage for that locality, have the right to drain their land into it 
by artificial means. He is not entitled to put levees or embankment along the 
ditches stopping the surface water which in times of high water would run over 
his property and divert it all into the natural water course so that the land 
of an opposite owner would be overflowed; but he is bound to maintain openings 
in the levees so as to allow the surface waters to flow through. 
Raleigh v. Clark, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1554, 71 S,\,, 857 (1903) 
The defendant, whose farm adjoined plaintiff's and drained over it into 
a creek, agreed to construct and keep open a ditch from plaintiff's line to the 
creek and afterwards let the ditch fill up whereby plaintiff's land was over-
flowed and his crops damaged. It was held that if the plaintiff, by himself 
cleaning out the ditch, could have avoided the damage, he was only entitled to 
recover from defendant the reasonable cost of opening the ditch and keeping it 
open. 
Stone v. Ashurst, 285 Ky. 687, 149 s.w. 2d 4 (1941) 
A lower estate is subject to the servitude of receiving the natural flow 
of surface water from the upper estate and the owner of the lower estate has 
no right to erect embankments or create other obstructions which will cause the 
natural flow of water to stop and overflow the upper land. The owner of the 
upper estate has no right to make excavations, or drains upon his land by \Vhich 
the flow of surface water is diverted from its natural course and disposition 
and thereby cast upon the lower estate in an unnatural volume~ 
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Board of Trustees, Town of Auburn v. Chyle, 256 Ky. 283, 75 S.W, 2d 1039 (1934) 
Lower lands are subject to the servitude of receiving natural flow of 
surface water and the mere facilitating and accelerating of flow without in-
creasing quantity or direction is not actionable .. 
Steinke v, Vernon Lumber Co., 190 Ky. 231, 227 S,W, 274 (1921) 
The owner of an upper estate is not liable to the owner of a lower estate 
for injury from water flowing from upper to lower estate in an ordinary and 
usual way, but is liable if he changes the natural course of the water or 
causes it to collect and be cast upon the lower estate in a larger volume or 
in an unusual or swift stream. 
Hharton v. Barber, 188 Ky. 57, 221 S,H, 499 (1920) 
An upper owner has no right to increase materially the volume of water dis-
charged upon the lower estate nor cast upon the lower land water which would not 
have reached it if the natural drainage conditions had not been disturbed. The 
upper owner may not divert water from the ordinary channels upon a lower estate 
at a point which would not have been its natural destination, 
L & N R. Co. v. Stephen, 188 Ky. l, 220 S,vl, 746 (1920) 
Landowners by a railroad's right of way had no right under Kentucky Statute 
2380, Subsection 30, to drain into a public ditch to the injury of other land-
owners waters which did not naturally fall or flow upon their own lands, but 
came on such lands from the wrong or negligence of the railroad in digging a 
ditch on its right of way and throwing up an embankment, 
Pickerill v. City of Louisville, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 1239, 100 S,W, 873 
The owner of upper ground has no right to make excavations, barriers, or 
drains thereon by which the flow of surface water is diverted from its natural 
channel and a new channel made on the lower ground nor can he collect in one 
channel waters usually flowing onto his neighbor's land by several channels, 
and thereby increase the flow onto the lower ground, 
Robertson v. Daviess Gravel Road Co., 25 Ky. Law Rep, 1114, 77 S,1,, 189 
The right of the owner of property naturally draining on a road to have the 
surface water flm.J over the road extend no further than to burden the road with 
the natural flow of surface water and does not entitle such owner to collect the 
•·•ater from his and other lands into a ditch and discharge it on the road at a 
certain point and compel the proprietor of the road to thus receive it and pro-
vide for its disposal. 
Grinstead v. Sanders, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 40, 56 S,\;1 , 665 
Hhile the plaintiffs may cultivate their land according to the usual course 
of husbandry, they may not turn the natural course of the water so as to throw 
upon the defendants water which would naturally flow over their own land. The 
defendant does not have the right to erect a dam so as to throw the water back 
upon the plaintiff, 
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Board v, Schneider, 301 Ky. 289, 191 S,W, 2d 418 
A lower estate is subject to the servitude of rece1v1ng the natural flow 




ENGINEERING ASPECTS OF LIABILITIES 
ARISING FROM THE DRAINAGE OF SURFACE v1ATERS 
The purpose of this report is to outline the legal standards for drainage 
of surface waters in Kentucky in order to assist engineers in developing an 
understanding of their application, Engineers designing highway drainage struc-
tures should be aware of legal guidelines the Department should observe and 
respect in its handling of surface waters incident to highway facilities. This 
objective may be accomplished by first stating the legal standards or doctrines 
which the courts in Kentucky have employed and which the Department of Highways 
should recognize, Specific cases in which the Department was involved in liti-
gation have been examined to see why the Department was liable for damage. It 
is hoped that by illustrating the different elements of the legal standards with 
the actual engineering plans or a discussion of the actual field conditions over 
which the controversy arose, Department engineers may, thereby, avoid legal re-
dress in the future by employing due foresight in designing the facility. This 
awareness of the legal requirements should then be supplemented by technical 
expertise in applying the purely engineering considerations. 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
The first standard applied by the Kentucky Court of Appeals to drainage 
of surface waters is that "the upper owner cannot tap an additional source of 
water and discharge it upon the lower or servient owner". The second standard 
is that "the upper owner has no right by artificial means to a) change the nor-
mal flow of water, b) to increase the normal flow of water, or c) to accelerate 
the flow of water at any one point, in such manner as to unreasonably damage 
the lower owner''. The term 11 artificial means'' refers to culverts, pipe, paved 
ditches, and any other structure used by the Department to control surface water 
drainage. These standards were the only ones applied by the court until Decem-
ber 1967. 
In December 1967, the court adopted a third standard in the case of Klutey 
v. Department of Highways. This guideline states that "in effecting the reason-
able use of his land, a landowner, acting in good faith, may drain his land of 
surface water and cast them as a burden upon the land of another, although such 
drainage carries <Vith it some <Vaters which would otherwise have never gone that 
way but would have remained on the land until they were absorbed by the soil or 
evaporated in the air if: 
a) there is a reasonable necessity for such drainage; 
b) if reasonable care be taken to avoid unnecessary injury to the land 
receiving the burden; 
c) if the utility or benefit accruing to the land drained reasonably 
outweighs the gravity of the harm resulting to the land receiving the burden; 
and 
d) it is accomplished by reasonably improving and aiding the normal and 
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natural system of drainage according to its reasonable carrying capacity, or 
if, in the absence of a practical natural drain, a reasonable and feasible 
artificial drainage system is adopted. 
The court further stated that in connection with this newly adopted standard 
that 11 consideration of all relevant factors and special circumstances in each 
particular case" is necessary in the application of this standard to a parti-
cular situatione 
In substance, the third standard balances the reasonableness of the use 
of the land drained by the upper owner against the severity of damage to the 
lower owner or the gravity of the harm to the land receiving the burden of 
drainage. 
APPLICATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS 
In order to understand the application and use of these three legal stan-
dards to situations encountered by engineers in the solution of practical 
drainage problems, several actual situations where the Department was involved 
in litigation will be examined from an engineering standpoint. The cases illus-
trated in Figures 1 through 14 are taken from engineering design plans, and the illustrations depict the drainage situations where the controversies arose. 
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS v. McKINNEY 
The first case involved the reconstruction and widening of US 60 in 
McCracken County just west of Paducah (see Figure 1). The legal problem was 
created by the construction of a 4- x 2- foot box culvert at Station 240 + 55 to drain waters from the hilly land on the south side of US 60. Prior to 
reconstruction there had been no culvert or pipe in this area to carry water 
from the south side over to the north side where the McKinney farm ,.,as located. 
Instead, the water that drained from the hilly terrain on the south side flowed 
into a ditch on the same side of the old road. This ditch ran parallel to the 
old road until it reached the existing culvert at Station 249 + 89. The water 
on the south side then flowed through this culvert and continued in a natural drain across one edge of the McKinney property. 
After construction of the culvert at Station 240 +55, water from the hill 
drained through this new culvert and across the middle of the McKinney farm. The farmland on the north side of the road was relatively flat. As a result of diverting the water from the south side across to the McKinney farm through the 
new culvert, a ditch five to six feet in depth was cut through the McKinney 
farm. Twenty acres of land were flooded after every heavy ran, and crops were 
destroyed. 
In the original design, there might have been a more careful consideration 
of the probable consequences of locating a culvert at a point where it would 
discharge water, which was then left to seek its own course, onto a lower owner. 
The new road followed the old road alignment in this section. The ditch along 
the south side of the old road was able to carry all the runoff from the hills 
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US 60 Reconstruction West of Paducah, Department v. McKinney. 
culvert at 240 + 55? Apparently, the court decided that it was not necessary, and ordered the Department to block the culvert entrance and construct a ditch on the south side of highway so that the water would drain through the culvert at Station 249 + 89, just as was the situation prior to construction. The court based its decision upon the second standard. It held that the Department had 
"diverted water from its natural course, and caused a change in the normal flow of water, in such manner as to unreasonably damage the lower owner". The court recognized the fact that the natural or normal flow would have been across the McKinney farmland if there had not been a road across the south edge of the farm. But the court also noted that the normal flow would have been more evenly distributed across the McKinney farm prior to the construction of a road and before the culvert was constructed at Station 240 + 55. The normal flow was stopped entirely by the old road and the south side ditch. With the new road and the new culvert at Station 240 + 55, the surface water runoff was concentra-ted and discharged through the new culvert. This amounted to a "change" and an 
"increase in the normal flow of water in such manner as to unreasonably damage the lower owner", which was held to be a violation of the second standard. 
COMMONWEAlTH v. KELLEY 
Reconstruction of a city street is illustrated by Figure 2. The suit arose over a ditch across the street from the Kelley property and parallel to the 
street and the 24-inch pipe located at Station 8 + 19.4. The ditch across the street from the Kelley house extends several hundred feet in either direction. Just a few hundred feet to the north of the street is a mountain slope, which slopes down toward the rear of the houses on the north side of the street. Dur-ing heavy rains, the ditch and the pipe at Station 8 + 19.4 did not carry all the runoff from the higher terrain on the north side of the street. The ditch overflowed and the water drained across the street and flooded the Kelley prop-erty, which was about 12 inches lower than the new street. The entire area to the south side of the street was low flatland. The overflow onto the Kelley property damaged the foundation of the house, making it unfit for occupancy. Extensive repairs were required to restore the house to livable conditions. By its design and construction, the Department had "changed the normal flow of 
water in such a manner as to unreasonably damage the lower owner". In making this decision the court was applying the second standard. 
However, if the third standard -- the "reasonable use" rule -- had been in effect at the time the Kelley case was decided in 1951, the court might have applied it as the standard. Application of part (c) of the "reasonable use" standard might have led the court to reason that "the utility or benefit accru-ing to the land drained" did not "reasonably outweigh the gravity of the harm resulting to the land receiving the burden", because the harm to Kelley was very great when compared to the benefit gained by the savings in construction costs of a small ditch across the street from Kelley and a pipe at Station 8 + 19.4. 
This case demonstrates the application of the second standard as applied by the court to hold the Department liable. It also provided an opportunity to suggest how another standard might be applicable in reaching the same decision. 
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS v. COREY 

























































Kelley Residence on East Main Street, US 460, in Salyersville, 
Commonwealth v. Kelley. 
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was located about ten mi.les east of Barbourville on KY 11 in Bull Creek. 
\Jith 
the culv~r·t 1oc.8.tHd a:J gh,r);..n:-~ ir~ ff.gut'e 3 t the current of the stream f
lows al-
most at a right angle to the culvert entrance. The center section of th
e 
double box culvert acts as a barricade to the drifts of logs, brush, and 
debris 
carried by Bull Creek. Debris caught by the mid-wall of the culvert acts
 as a 
dam and causes water to back up and flood the land above the culvert. A 
whirl-
pool effect in the creek near the culvert entrance cut away some of the 
bottom 
land above the culvert. On the outlet end, the stream changed its channe
l by 
increasing the width from 25 feet to about 60 feet, thus taking some down
stream 
~creage from the fertile bottom farmland. In this situation, the court a
pplied 
the second standard and held that the construction of the culvert "change
d the 
normal flow of water" by flooding and cutting gorges above the culvert an
d by 
widening the channel below the culvert, The court stated that this was a
 "taking" 
of property and the owner must be compensated. A design which might have
 mini-
mized such damage is a channel change and shift of the location of the cu
lvert 
about 50 feet west of the actual site. 
The "reasonable use" test of third standard had not been adopted by the 
court when this case was decided. If it had been in effect, the court m
ight 
have applied part b) or c) in deciding the question of liability. 
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS v. ROUNDTREE 
This case illustrates the application of the first standard by the court 
to find the Department liable for "tapping an additional source of water 
and 
discharging it upon the lower owner". Here a curb catch basin or inlet w
as 
constructed on the south side of US 27 within the city limits of Whitley 
City. 
The grade of US 27 is downhill from the northeast to the southwest, as in
dica-
ted by the centerline profile in Figure 4. The cross slope of the pavement is 
to the southeast side of the road. This causes the surface water runoff 
from 
the pavement to drain toward the Roundtree property. A curb inlet was co
nstruc-
ted at the edge of the road just in front of the Roundtree property, as indica-
ted in Figure 4. All of the water from a 13,000-square foot area of pavement 
uphill of the curb inlet emptied into this inlet at the Roundtree propert
y. 
The water was discharged through the outlet end in the rock retaining wa
ll and 
into a drain or a low area across the Roundtree lot. Due to the large vo
lume 
of water collected by the inlet and discharged onto Roundtree's property,
 the 
open area south of the residence was flooded. The court held that draini
ng all 
the water from the 13,000-square foot area of pavement uphill from Round
tree 
was "tapping an additional source of water", and this is not permitted by
 the 
first standard, 
Since the highway continued at the same grade downhill to the southwest 
of the Roundtree property, and therefore the runoff would continue down t
he 
edge of the pavement if there were no curb inlet at this site, the court 
ordered 
the Department to seal off the inlet. 
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS v. SMITH 
In the situation illustrated in Figure 5, the court held that the Depart-
ment did "tap an additional source of water and discharge it upon the low
er 
owner", again an application of the first standard. The Department const
ructed 
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Railroad Street, Irvine, across Smith Property, Department v. Smith. 
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above the elevation of the. Smith property. The profile grade of the street 
sloped dmm at abot1t 3.5 percent past the Smith property from north to south. 
The cross slope of the pavement ,.,as toward the Smith 1 s. Consequently, the 
surface water runoff from the pavement, beginning at Station 3 + 18 drained 
toward the Smith lot~ A concrete flume was constructed near Station 5 + 00 
to collect the runoff from the street. However, no curb on the Smith side of 
the street between Stations 3 + 50 and 5 + 00 had been constructed. Conse-
quently, all of the runoff from the street drained over into the Smith yard 
instead of the flume, which had been designed to collect this runoff. Before 
the street was constructed, the water from the property behind and to the north 
of the Smith property drained into a ravine running north to south across the 
east side of the Smith property. This ravine was filled in construction of the 
street~ The "additional source of water 11 which was 11 tapped 11 was this runoff 
from the entire pavement surface as far back into the intersection as Station 
3 + 18. 
After the suit was decided, the Department constructed the 11 missing" sec-
tion of curb from Station 3 + 50 to the flume at Station 5 + 00. 
COMMONHEALTH v. ROBBINS 
In this case, the court held that "when surface water is unreasonably 
diverted from its natural course of drainage and cast upon land into which 
that surface water had not previously flowed", the person or persons causing 
the diversion are liable for the resulting damage. The situation is depicted 
in Figure 6. A street was constructed across the rear of the Robbins proper-
ty. The residence shown at the top in Figure 6 was downhill from the mountain 
in the lower left corner of the plan view. Prior to the construction of the 
street, the surface water runoff from the mountain was evenly distributed over 
all the property owners at the bottom of the mountain. The Robbins property 
was only one of five or six receiving the watere However, during construction, 
a ditch, which catches all water flowing off the mountain and all the property below for a distance of about 600 feet, was excavated on the east side of the 
street. An 18-inch cross-drain pipe was constructed at Station 15 + 41 to 
pick up the discharge from the ditch. No further drainage provisions were 
made to take care of the water being discharged at the outlet end of the 18-
inch pipe at the rear of Robbins lot. There was an existing shallow ditch down the Robbins' north property line. Since no provisions had been made to 
carry the water m<ay from the outlet end of the pipe (west end), the water ran down the ditch at the north property line until it reached a low area about 15 
feet from the rear of Robbins house. The water nm> stands about 14 inches deep in this low area after heavy rains, a condition which did not exist prior to 
constructiond Extensive damage was done to the basement of the house. 
The court applied the second standard to these circumstances to find the 
Department liable. By means of the ditch and the 18-inch pipe at Station 15 + L~l, there was an "increase in the normal flow of water", and, as a result, the 
"lower owner 'tvas unreasonably damaged''. 
The court did not apply its first standard to this situation but it might 
be said that the ditch acted as a conduit to "tap an additional source of water" 
because most of the runoff from the mountain did not flow across the Robbins 
property prior to construction. 
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There was another cross-drain pipe about 300 feet ahead of the 18-inch pipe installed at Station 18 + 41. The ditch could have been extended to this pipe and the 18-inch pipe at Station 15 + 41 eliminated. The drain from the 
outlet of the second pipe led to a small creek. 
KLUTEY v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHNAYS 
In late 1967, the Kentucky Court of Appeals introduced a new legal test to be used in deciding surface water drainage casese This was called the "reason-
able use" rule and was adopted in the case of Klutey v. Department of Highways. There the Department was not liable because the water damage to the property 
was taken into consideration as one factor in the actual condemnation award in 
the original taking of right of way for constructing the new road. Figure 7 illustrates the actual situation over which the litigation arose. The legal question raised by the suit was the extent to \·lhich the Commonwealth, by an 
artificial drainage system, may lawfully accelerate the flow of surface water 
onto the lower owner in a natural drainage directhn. The property west of the 
new road was lower than that east of the road, The natural drain was from the hilly side on the east, as illustrated in Figure 7, down to the lowland on the 
west side of the road, The Department constructed two pipes, one 18 inches in diameter and the other 24 inches, to carry the surface water from east to west 
under the new roadway, which acted as a dam across the path of the natural drain, The property owner claimed that these two pipes accelerated the flow of water 
over his land, and, as a result, deep ditches were cut in the property and there 
was some flooding of the lowland west of the new road, The court then stated 
that "the lower owner has the servient estate and he must accept drainage from his neighboring upper owner. Also, it must be recognized that any artificial 
utilization of land by the upper owner may, in some degree, affect the natural drainage on adjoining lower lands. Acceleration of the flow often results 
when the upper owner modifies his drainage system", To determine whether or 
not the upper owner is liable for a change in the natural drainage, the court 
stated it was a matter of "balancing the reasonableness of the use by the upper 
owner against the severity of damage to the lower owner". 
The Court of Appeals stated that the trial court judge had considered the 
necessary factors in deciding that the Department's drainage design was reason-
able. The court further stated that "of significance was the public necessity for this type of drainage system according to accepted standards". 
Even though the court's decision was in favor of the Department in the Klutey case, it cannot be stated with a certainty that Figure 7 illustrates a proper engineering application of the "reasonable use" standard, because Klutey had been compensated for the water damage in an earlier condemnation trial award. Had it not been for this previous compensation award to Klutey, which was based in part upon the water damage caused by the 13-inch and the 24-inch pipes, the 
court very well might have found the Department liable. 
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS v. BAIRD 
The first case in which the Court of Appeals applied the reasonable use 
standard to find the Department liable was Department of Highways v. Baird, de-
cided May 30, 1969. The property owner, Baird, was aHarded a judgment because 
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the construction of an interstate highway on a right of way adjoining the Baird 
property (see Figures 8 and 9). Figure 8 shows the 42-acre drainage area, and 
Figure 9 shows the location of a 42-inch pipe at Station 541 + 64.1 constructed. 
to collect the runoff from this drainage area. 
The Baird property, a small parcel of land on which was located an uphols-
tery shop, was downstream from the 42-acre drainage area in Figure 8, Water 
flowed down the valley through a small natural drain. The drain continued along 
one side of the Baird property to a culvert under existing US 25. Prior to con-
struction of the interstate road at the rear of Baird's upholstery shop, the 
natural drain along the side of the property handled the flow of surface waters 
with no difficulty. There had been no previous overflow or flooding problem, 
The fill on the interstate at the rear of the upholstery shop is about 33 feet high, The outlet end of the 42-inch pipe is in the natural drain running along 
the side of the Baird property but is within fifteen feet of the shop, There 
is also a paved ditch running diagonally down the side of the fill nearest the 
Baird property (see Figure 9). Flow of water into the natural drain alongside 
of the Baird property was so accelerated after the construction of the inter-
state across the valley that the natural drain could not carry all the water, When rains fell, surface water collected and carried through the 42-inch pipe 
and the paved ditch was more than could be handled by the natural drain, Thus, 
the natural drainage channel overflowed at the outlet end of the pipe and flooded 
the upholstery shop. 
The court stated that under the "reasonable use" standard "the upper owner 
under certain conditions may be liable for acceleration of the flow of surface 
water without having tapped a new watershed" (reference to the older, first 
standard applied by the court), The court also stated that there must be a balancing of the reasonableness of the use of the land drained (or of the 
utility of such use) against the gravity of the harm to the land receiving the 
burden of the drainage. 
Here, the damage was severe because flooding destroyed almost 75 percent 
of the value of the Baird property. The court stated that "damage of such pro-
portions must be considered to outweigh the admitted reasonableness or "utility" 
of the Highway Department use of its right of way", This is not to say that 
damage to the lower owner which would have destroyed less than 75 percent of 
the value of the property would be held reasonable, 
One possible solution to the problem in the original design would have been 
to extend the 42-inch pipe at Station 541 + 64.1 to a point beyond the uphols-
tery shop and to make the channel deeper for a few feet beyond the outlet end 
of the pipe. It should be noted from examining Figure 9 that the outlet end of 
the pipe and the shop were in very close proximity, 
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS v. WATSON 
The last case to be examined is Department of Highways v. Watson, decided June 20, 1969, about a year and a half after the "reasonable use" standard was 
first established in the Klutey case. The "reasonable use" standard was applied by the court in the Baird case just three weeks prior to this case. However, in 
the present case, the court did not use its newest standard to determine liabil-ity. Instead, the court used the second standard as the guideline to apply in 
the Watson caseB 
-42-
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The court held that the Department was liable for damage from surface water 
drainage because the construction of I 75 and two parallel frontage roads "un-
reasonably diverted surface water from its natural course of drainage and cast 
them upon" Hatson's land "where it had not previously flowed". The court did 
not mention the ''reasonable use" standard and the "balancing of factors 11 , as it 
had in the Klutey and Baird cases. 
Figures 10 through 14 illustrate the situation involved in the present 
case. These figures should be studied very carefully in order to visualize the 
terrain conditions where this particular section of I 75 was constructed. The 
most significant fact to note is the location of the Watson property in relation 
to the interstate (see Figure 10). It is about 1500 to 2000 feet east of I 75 
and not adjacent to the constructed road, as has been the situation in each of 
the previous cases studied. This is the first such situation in Kentucky where 
the property owner was located that far away from the construction and was suc-
cessful in a suit against the Department for damage from surface water drainage. 
This drainage situation is very complex because there was no one feature 
which contributed to the damage as there was in the Smith case, where failure 
to extend a curb to the constructed drain flume (see Figure 5) caused the dam-
age. Instead, the damage in the present case was the consequence of the com-
bined effect of all drainage structures and features in a 2000-foot section of 
I 75 and the two parallel frontage roads. Watson's property was located at the 
bottom of a deep, wooded ravine, as noted in Figure 10. A natural drainage 
ditch, which drained the entire valley above the Watson property, came down the 
mountain valley directly in front of the Hatson house. The ditch delineated the 
city limits line, as noted by the broken line in front of Watson's house. At the 
bottom of the valley, directly opposite the Watson house, the ditch makes a 90 
degree turn and runs south and parallel to the street for about 75 to 100 feet. 
Then it crosses under the street in two 24-inch pipes. It was at the point of 
the 90-degree turn opposite the Watson house that the overflow and flooding 
occurred after I 75 was constructed across the valley about 2000 feet away from 
the Hatson property. 
The critical section of I 75 begins at Station 648 + 00 and ends 2000 feet 
ahead at Station 668 + 00 (see Figure 11). In addition to the section of I 75, 
two frontage roads were also constructed across the valley. Frontage Road 13 is 
the relocation of KY 204, the only road which crossed the valley prior to the 
interstate construction, Figure 12 represents the centerline profile of Frontage 
Road 13. The valley is between Stations 32 + 00 and 49 + 00 on this road. 
Frontage Road 14 is just east of I 75 (see Figure 11), The profile of Frontage 
Road 14 is presented in Figure 14. 
Surface water runoff collected by all of the drainage structures, pavement 
surfaces, and slopes shown in Figure 11 ultimately reach one of the streams in 
Figure 11. Although it is not shown in Figure 11, these streams converge into 
one ditch dmvn the valley that makes the 90-degree turn opposite the Watson prop-
erty. From the point where the streams converge, all of the surface water runoff 
from the valley above where the new roads were constructed runs down this one ditch 
until it reaches the bottom of the ravine opposite the Hatson property. 
The court characterized this overflotv as "conduct" which unreasonably 
changed the existing water course so as to substantially damage the property of 
the lmver mmer's land, where it had not previously flmved. The court, by this 
-45-
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Figure 11. Plan of I 75 and Two Frontage Roads Showing the Drainag
e System, 
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9 
language, applied the second standard to find the Department liable in this 
case. The court also stated that whether or not a new watershed was tapped by 
the Department in its design and construction, the Department may still be lia-
ble for the results. In effect, the court was saying that the fact that the 
first standard -- "cannot tap additional source of water and discharge it upon 
the lm;er owner" -- had not been violated does not preclude the court from 
applying another standard to find the Department liable for the damage to the 
1,Jatson property. The change in the water course was caused by an increase in 
the flow of the ditch so that it was unable to carry all the runoff during peak 
periods at the 90-degree turn~ The "change" in the existing water course was 
the overflow and flooding which occurred, 
Construction in the critical sections of I 75 and the two frontage roads 
involved two median box inlets, several thousand square feet of pavement sur-
face, paved ditches, normal roadside ditches, considerable surface area on the 
face of high fills and deep cuts, and improvement of some land adjacent to the 
road by converting it from woodland to grase land. Each of these items great-
ly increased the rate of runoff, and ultimately the volume of surface ~water be-
ing carried down the ditch above Hatson's house. The drainage area above the 
interstate was 95 percent woodland prior to the construction of these roads. 
Significant factors to note about this case are: 1) the complexity of 
the situation and the design; 2) the ultimate impact of the drainage design 
upon the volume of runoff; 3) the Watson property is located 1500 to 2000 feet 
away from the road construction; and 4) the court applied the second standard 
and not the third standard to finri liability. The part of the second standard 
applied by the court is that "the upper owner has no right by artificial means 
to change the normal flow of water". 
SUMMARY 
Each of the cases examined illustrate hmJ the legal standards for drainage 
of surface waters have been applied by the courts to situations involving the 
Department of Highwaye. The engineer faced with a drainage problem will have 
to apply each of these standards to his particular solution of the design prob-
lem. Ideally, the final design should satisfy each element of the three standards, 
and the engineer should ask himself if the design does measure up to each stan-
dard in every respect. 
To serve as a kind of checklist against which the engineer should test or 
compare designs, the three legal standards or guidelines are summarized as fol-
lows: 
1. The upper owner cannot tap an additional source of water and discharge 
it upon the lmver owner or servient tenemente 
2. The upper owner has no right, by artificial means (paved ditch, culvert, 
catch basin, etc,) to: 
a. change the normal flow of water, 
b. increase the normal flow of water, 
-51-
c. accelerate the flow of water at any one point, 
in such a manner as to unreasonably damage the lower owner. 
3. In effecting a reasonable use of his land for a legitimate purpose, a 
landowner, acting in good faith, may drain his land of surface waters 
and cast them as a burden upon the land of another, although such 
drainage carries with it some waters which would otherwise have never 
gone that way but would have remained on the land until they were ab-
sorbed by the soil or evaporated in the air, if: 
a. there is a reasonable necessity for such drainage, 
b. reasonable care is taken to avoid unnecessary injury to the land 
receiving the burden, 
c. the utility or benefit accruing to the land drained outweighs the 
gravity of harm resulting to the land receiving the burden, and 
d. where practicable, it is accomplished by reasonably improving and 
aiding the normal and natural system of drainage according to its 
reasonable carrying capacity, or if in the absence of a practica-
ble natural drain, a reasonable and feasible artificial drainage 
system is applied. 
The courts recognize that there is no magical solution to surface water drainage 
problems, and that it is a matter of judgment in each case. However, the courts 
have established these three criteria or standards to use in making those judg-
ments. 
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